The median QSBS exclusion is

$2,810

Not millions. Not a billionaire loophole. Half of all QSBS claimants exclude less than this. A few thousand dollars of startup stock.

The data on Section 1202 tells a different story than the one you've been hearing.

See the evidence ↓

The "94% Goes to Millionaires" Claim

You've probably heard that 94% of QSBS benefits go to millionaires. The Treasury data shows why that's misleading.

Who claims QSBS?

By number of unique claimants (average income excluding QSBS gains)

Income measured as average Total Positive Income (TPI), excluding QSBS gains. Source: Treasury OTA WP-127, Figure 4.

Count the people, not just the dollars:

74%

of QSBS claimants earn under $1 million

The single largest group (35%) earns $100K-$400K. These are founders and early employees, not millionaires.

How ITEP gets to 94%

ITEP claims: "94% of QSBS exclusions were claimed by people with more than $1 million of annual income."

That's a dollar-weighted stat, not a count of people. Here's how they construct it:

1

74% of dollars go to people who already earned over $1M before counting QSBS gains

2

20% of dollars go to people earning under $1M normally, whose one-time startup exit temporarily pushed them over

=

ITEP lumps both groups to claim 94% "goes to millionaires."

These two groups are the incentive working as designed.

The 74% are investors who funded early-stage companies. The 20% are founders and employees who built them. QSBS connects capital to builders. Both sides show up in the "94%" because both sides took the risk the policy was designed to reward.

Source: U.S. Treasury OTA Working Paper 127, January 2025

How Treasury actually measures income (and why it matters)

Treasury's Working Paper 127 classifies QSBS claimants using Total Positive Income (TPI), the sum of positive income sources on a tax return. Critically, QSBS gains that are excluded from income are also excluded from TPI. This is a deliberate methodological choice: Treasury measures a claimant's regular economic income, not a one-time liquidity event.

Treasury also uses a 3-year average TPI (the current year plus the prior two years) to classify claimants, smoothing out year-to-year volatility. For unique claimant counts, they average TPI over the full 11-year sample period (2012–2022). This methodology is designed to capture a person's typical income level.

Example: A founder earning $150K/year sells their company after 8 years for $2M. By Treasury's methodology (which excludes QSBS gains from income), they're classified in the $100K-$400K income bracket. Not a millionaire. ITEP adds the gain back to reach "94%," reclassifying this person as a millionaire based on a single liquidity event.

ITEP's approach (adding the excluded QSBS gain back into income) directly undoes Treasury's deliberate choice. The result: people with normal incomes who had one successful exit get lumped in with actual high-income earners, inflating the "millionaire" count.

Methodology: Treasury OTA WP-127, Section III ("Data and Sample Construction")

Who Actually Uses It

$2,810

Median annual QSBS exclusion

Half of all claimants exclude less than this

75%

claim it exactly once in 11 years

Only 6% claim it five or more years

2.55%

of all capital gains in 2021

QSBS is a rounding error on total cap gains

Who QSBS actually helps

Senior Engineer

A senior engineer at a 50-person startup exercises $40K in stock after 6 years.

With QSBS $0 state tax
Without $5,320

First-time Founder

A first-time founder sells after 8 years for $2M. First liquidity event of their career.

With QSBS $0 state tax
Without $266,000

Early Employee

Employee #12 exercises options worth $150K after the company is acquired. Five years of below-market salary.

With QSBS $0 state tax
Without $19,950

Seed Investor

Puts $25K into a friend's company. 7 years later it's worth $200K.

With QSBS $0 state tax
Without $23,275

How large is a typical QSBS exclusion?

Annual exclusion amount by percentile. 90% of claimants exclude less than $591K.

Source: Treasury OTA WP-127, Table 1. Percentiles of annual individual QSBS exclusion claims, 2012-2022.

Distribution data: U.S. Treasury OTA Working Paper 127, January 2025. Archetype examples are illustrative, based on typical QSBS claim profiles.

Exit Tax Calculator

See what your state actually takes from a qualified small business stock exit under Section 1202.

The median QSBS exclusion is $2,810

State tax on this exit in Alabama

$0

Compare key states on the same exit

State Tax Rate QSBS Status Tax on Exit
Texas 0% No income tax $0
Florida 0% No income tax $0
Washington 7% conforms $0
California 13.3% decoupled $0
Oregon 9.9% pending $0
New York 10.9% pending $0

Does It Work?

The academic evidence is limited but consistent. Both peer-reviewed studies measure the marginal effect of the 2010 expansion to 100% exclusion, not the existence of QSBS itself, and both find significant positive effects.

Edwards & Todenhaupt (2020) ↗

Investment in startup firms increased by approximately 12% after the 100% exclusion

Method: Within-firm variation comparing funding rounds before/after SBJA 2010

Chen & Farre-Mensa (2023/2025) ↗

QSBS-eligible industries experienced more firm births, more startup employment, and increased first-round VC

Method: Diff-in-diff comparing eligible vs ineligible industries after 2010 increase to 100%

The Self-Defeating Policy

States that decouple from QSBS lose the people and the revenue. Migration data doesn't lie.

State QSBS Conformity

Conforms
Decoupled
Pending
Partial
No income tax

33

Conform

6

Decoupled

2

Pending

2

Partial

8

No income tax

The Migration Problem

Top 5 States Gaining Filers

Top 5 States Losing Filers

$102 billion

in AGI lost by California to outbound migration, 2020-2022

In 2022 alone, 24,670 high-earner households left, taking $16.1 billion in AGI.

Migration is driven by multiple factors (housing costs, remote work, overall tax burden) and QSBS conformity is one factor among many. But the pattern is clear: capital flows toward lower-tax, QSBS-conforming states.

Sources: CA Legislative Analyst's Office (2024), Center for Jobs (2024)

Migration data: IRS SOI Migration Data 2021-2022, Tax Foundation analysis Dec 2024

The Campaign

Nearly identical bills showed up in multiple states within months. Same data, same framing, same legislative session.

Coordinated Campaign Timeline

Dec 2024

DC passes B25-0900

Unanimous council vote to decouple from federal QSBS

Jan 2025

Oregon introduces SB 1507

QSBS decoupling bill using ITEP analysis and OCPP testimony

Jan 2025

Washington introduces SB 6229

Capital gains tax decoupling from QSBS exclusion

Feb 2025

New York includes decoupling in budget proposal

QSBS decoupling included as part of broader tax changes

Same playbook. Different states. Same session.

Who's behind it

  • ITEP (Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy) produces the "94%" stat and provides model legislation
  • Working Families Party runs state-level political campaigns
  • OCPP (Oregon Center for Public Policy) supplied the analysis behind Oregon's SB 1507

The messaging

"Trump tax giveaway"

QSBS was signed by President Clinton in 1993, expanded to 100% exclusion by President Obama in 2010. Bipartisan policy, partisan framing.

Bundled revenue estimates

Revenue projections lump QSBS decoupling with unrelated tax changes, inflating the headline number.

Why Blanket Decoupling Is the Wrong Answer

If there are concerns about how QSBS is used at the top end, the response should be proportional. Not a blunt instrument that hits everyone.

What decoupling actually does

  • × Taxes the engineer exercising $40K in startup stock the same way it taxes a $50M exit
  • × Punishes the 74% of claimants earning under $1M to address concerns about the top end
  • × Drives founders and capital to conforming states, losing both the people and the revenue
  • × Ignores that 75% of claimants use QSBS exactly once. This isn't a recurring loophole for most people

What the data actually supports

  • QSBS increases startup investment by ~12% (Edwards & Todenhaupt)
  • QSBS drives more firm births and startup employment (Chen & Farre-Mensa)
  • The median exclusion is $2,810, less than most people's tax refund
  • States that decouple lose high-earner filers to states that don't

Decoupling doesn't solve a problem. It creates new ones.

It doesn't raise meaningful revenue (people move). It doesn't target abuse (it hits everyone equally). And it removes one of the few incentives that actually works to encourage startup formation and risk-taking.

Reform, not repeal

If trust stacking and high-end exclusions are the concern, address those directly: cap individual lifetime QSBS exclusions at $10M per taxpayer across all entities, closing the trust stacking multiplication while preserving the benefit for typical founders and employees.

What You Can Do

Data without distribution is just noise. Get this in front of decision-makers.

Contact your state legislator

Most legislators voting on QSBS decoupling haven't seen the Treasury data. Send it to them.

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Sources

U.S. Treasury OTA Working Paper 127 ↗

January 2025. Primary source for all distribution, claimant, and exclusion data (2012-2022).

Edwards & Todenhaupt (2020) ↗

Study finding ~12% increase in startup investment after 100% QSBS exclusion. Uses within-firm funding round variation.

Chen & Farre-Mensa (2023/2025) ↗

Diff-in-diff study finding more firm births, startup employment, and first-round VC in QSBS-eligible industries.

IRS SOI Migration Data, 2021-2022 ↗

Interstate migration of tax filers and AGI. See also: Tax Foundation analysis (Dec 2024) ↗

California Legislative Analyst's Office (2024) ↗

Analysis of high-earner outmigration and AGI losses from California, 2020-2022.

ITEP Section 1202 Analysis ↗

Source of the "94% goes to millionaires" claim. State-by-state revenue estimates.